University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
Volume 51

Number 1

Article 8

12-18-2019

How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays a Role in the China and
U.S. International Relations Saga
Tessa V. Mears

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Recommended Citation
Tessa V. Mears, How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays a Role in the China and U.S. International
Relations Saga, 51 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 185 (2019)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol51/iss1/8

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-American Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays
a Role in the China and U.S.
International Relations Saga
Tessa V. Mears*
“How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays a Role in the
China and U.S. International Relations Saga” takes a look
at a June 2018 Supreme Court decision that ruled federal
courts are not bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law. This paper discusses the pros
and cons of absolute deference to foreign governments in
these instances, in addition to examining the effectiveness
of foreign amicus briefs in antitrust cases before the Supreme Court. This paper finishes with a discussion on the
current state of international relations China and the U.S.,
with a summary of where the case leaves us today.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A foreign company wants to do business with the United
States. It is comprised of wise business-persons, and it knows that
the U.S. market has the potential to be very lucrative. The company enters into a contract with a U.S. company and all seems to be
going well. In an unforeseen twist, the U.S. company sues the foreign company for violating American antitrust law vis-à-vis pricefixing activities. However, the foreign company believes it can get
“off the hook” because the U.S. law it is accused of violating is in
direct conflict with a law of its own country that it is forced to
obey. A government agency from its own country even submits an
amicus brief on its behalf to support the company’s defense that its
foreign law requires price-fixing. Unbeknownst to the company,
according to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, U.S.
federal courts do not have to defer to a country’s interpretation of
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its own laws.1 What the foreign company once thought would be a
strong defense may now be altogether meaningless.
Foreign companies can face this exact dilemma with globalization and foreign law.2 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, imports to the U.S. from September 2019 alone totaled $258.4
billion.3 With the U.S. government and U.S. companies so enveloped in international relations and trade, the need to understand
how foreign laws work for the context of litigation is clear. Similar
to domestic disputes, the outcome of a case can hinge on the decision of which law to apply.4 Conducting international business typically requires a common understanding in order to contract.5 Unfortunately, the federal courts’ approach to interpreting international law has been widely inconsistent. When issues arise causing
courts to intervene, it is unpredictable how a federal court will
choose to rely on information from a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Animal
Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
sought to provide guidance to an area of the law lacking direction.6
The issue the Court considered was: “[w]hen foreign law is relevant to a case instituted in a federal court, and the foreign government whose law is in contention submits an official statement on
the meaning and interpretation of its domestic law, may the federal
court look beyond that official statement?”7

1

See infra Part III; Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm.
Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018).
2
For the purposes of this paper, “foreign law” will refer to the law of another country. This is to be distinguished from international law, which is the
law that is binding on all nations.
3
Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Trade in Goods and Services, https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-trade-goods-and-services
-september-2019 (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
4
See Carolyn B. Lamm & K. Elizabeth Tang, Rule 44.1 and Proof of Foreign Law in Federal Court, 30 LITIG. 31, 32 (2003).
5
See generally Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of
Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 889 (2011).
6
See generally Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co.
Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018).
7
Id.
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The Court held that a federal court should practice “respectful
consideration” when considering a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws, but it is not bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws when deciding legal issues
that involve foreign law.8 The Court used language from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 (“FRCP 44.1”) to support its reasoning, looking to the Advisory Committee Notes of this rule, which
says that the court “may engage in its own research and consider
any relevant material thus found.”9
The Chinese defendants in Animal Science Products, Inc. were
accused of violating U.S. antitrust laws.10 U.S. antitrust enforcement is concerned with foreign actions that have a significant and
purposeful effect on the United States.11 A uniform standard for
foreign government deference in antitrust law had been long
awaited.12
This note will analyze both the social and political climate that
led up to the Animal Science Products, Inc. decision, as well as the
effects it will have on us all. Part II will discuss the history of
FRCP 44.1 and the significance of its 1966 amendment. Part III
will discuss the procedural history and circumstances leading up to
the Animal Science Products, Inc. case. Part IV will examine the
reaction of foreign amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, as well as
the reasons in favor and in opposition of deference to foreign governments’ interpretation of their own laws. Part V will discuss the
recent trade talks with China with the U.S., and the longstanding
complicated relationships of these two countries to provide context. Finally, Part VI will bring together the takeaways from Animal Science Products, Inc. and where the decision leaves us today.

8

Id.
This means courts can rely on any research they choose, whether or not it
was submitted by the parties. Id. at 1869-70 (citing Advisory Committee’s 1966
Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 892).
10
Id. at 1870.
11
See John Deq. Briggs, Schrödinger’s Cat and Extraterritoriality, 29
ANTITRUST 79, 79 (2014).
12
See id. at 84.
9
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PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE

A.

The Important Role of FRCP 44.1 for Foreign Law
From the time of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s adoption until 1966, the rules did not address the requirement of interpreting foreign law.13 From 1938 to 1996, the majority of federal
courts reviewed foreign laws as facts.14 This made it difficult to
prevail on a motion for summary judgment because opposing parties only needed to present a dispute regarding the substance of the
foreign law.15 Further, the pre-1966 FRCP 44.1 required appellate
courts to view disputes of foreign law under the “clearly erroneous” standard, which meant they were effectively closed off from
reviewing trial court rulings in application of foreign law.16
In 1966, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
changed FRCP 44.1 to view foreign law as a question of law instead of fact.17 The new FRCP 44.1 states:
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s law must give notice by a pleading
or other writing. In determining foreign law, the
court may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as
a ruling on a question of law.18
With this update to the rule came two major effects: (1) federal
courts were no longer restricted on the research they could conduct
when faced with questions of foreign law, and (2) federal courts no
longer had to rely on the Federal Rules of Evidence when consid13

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the Fact Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613,
653 (1967).
14
See Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1956)
(“[t]he general federal rule is that the ‘law’ of a foreign country is a fact which
must be proved.”); Miller, supra note 13, at 653-54.
15
See Proof of Foreign Law after Four Decades with Rule 44.1 FRCP AND
CPLR 4511, 61 REC. ASS’N. CITY N.Y. 49, 50 (2006).
16
Id.
17
Lamm & Tang, supra note 4, at 31.
18
FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.

190

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:185

ering information about foreign law.19 In other words, courts could
now view any relevant materials when making their determination
on foreign laws. This discretion allows the judge to consider several critical factors in determining an issue of foreign law, including:
significance of foreign law to the case, intricacy of the foreign-law
question, and the best way to fairly cater to the needs of both parties.20
The scope of evidence admissible for applying and interpreting
foreign law widened dramatically.21 Despite the update to the
Rules (because the Rules left the issue of what evidence to consider open open), courts continue to use diverse approaches when addressing a question of foreign law.22 This diversity is problematic
because courts strive to achieve solidarity in decision making, so it
is no surprise that this issue reached the United States Supreme
Court in Animal Science Products, Inc.23
III.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CASE SUMMARY
This dispute began in 2005 between Chinese sellers of Vitamin
C and American buyers of this product.24 The U.S. buyers filed a
19

Lamm & Tang, supra note 4, at 31.
Miller, supra note 13, at 660.
21
For example, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have allowed unauthenticated copies and translations of foreign law. See Forzley v. AVCO Corp. Elec.
Div., 826 F.2d 974, 979 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987); Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos
Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 497 n.11 (5th Cir. 1973).
22
Compare Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F3d 694,
707 (5th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that “domestic policy should have priority over
comity and that a court should not be compelled to protect foreign interests over
interests of the forum state”), and Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that “[c]omity cannot be the source
of a disability that prevents a district court from having the power to address
wrongdoing that impacts a domestic court . . . comity must yield to domestic
policy”) with Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on Mar.
16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A court of the United States
owes substantial deference to the construction France places on its domestic
law.”).
23
Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865 (2018).
24
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
20
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class-action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York against four Chinese sellers, alleging that the Chinese
sellers agreed to both price-fixing and quantity-fixing in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.25 The Chinese sellers filed a motion to dismiss based on their defense that the price-and-quantityfixing were mandatory under Chinese law.26 The Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (“the Chinese government”) submitted an amicus brief to the court asserting that (1)
the Chinese sellers’ defense was accurate, and (2) it was the administrative agency responsible for regulating trade in China.27
The U.S. buyers presented three important pieces of evidence
in response: (1) a publication that revealed that the Chinese sellers
had agreed to fix the price and quantity of Vitamin C, (2) expert
testimony, and (3) pointed out that the Chinese sellers did not
name any particular law or regulation that required this business
conduct.28 The U.S. buyers specifically pointed to China’s statement to the World Trade Organization that it concluded its regulation of Vitamin C exports in 2002.29 In light of FRCP 44.1, the
district court ruled that a foreign government’s interpretation of its
law does not automatically qualify for absolute and conclusive
deference and that further investigation is permitted.30 Therefore,
the district court looked beyond the interpretation of law proffered
by the Chinese government and found that its government did not
compel the price-fixing and quantity-fixing activities of the Chinese suppliers.31 The district court denied the motion to dismiss,
and it later denied the Chinese suppliers’ motion for summary
judgment.32

25

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548 (E.D.N.Y.
2008), rev’d, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865,
201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
26
Id. at 548.
27
Id. at 552.
28
Id. at 554-55.
29
Id. at 549.
30
Id. at 556.
31
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
32
Id. at 560; In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 566-67
(E.D.N.Y. 2011)
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The district court’s decision was then reversed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.33 The Second Circuit reasoned that when
a foreign government provides an official statement that interprets
its contested law, federal courts are “bound to defer” to the foreign
government’s interpretation as long as the interpretation is reasonable.34 The court solely relied on the amicus brief submitted by the
Chinese government.35 Because of this high level of deference, the
appellate court did not reach the other evidence presented by the
American buyers at the district court—most notably, the Chinese
government’s failure to point to a specific law or regulation that
required the Chinese suppliers to engage in price-fixing and quantity-fixing. Instead, the court was concerned with principles of international comity and reciprocity in reaching its decision.36 The
appellate court began its analysis with the first factor of the comity
balancing test: the degree of conflict with foreign law.37 Much like
the district court had done, the appellate court centered its analysis
on FRCP 44.1; however, the appellate court determined that merely because FRCP 44.1 tells a court what it can review when interpreting foreign law, does not mean it tells a court how it must examine the foreign law.38 Keeping principles of international comity
33

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm.
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
34
Id. at 189.
35
Id. at 189-190.
36
Id. at 184.
37
Id.; The list of internal comity factors are (1) Degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties, locations or principal places
of business of corporations; (3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of
conduct here as compared with conduct abroad; (4) The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the availability
of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (5) Existence of intent
to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; (6) Possible effect
upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) If
relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by
both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its order effective; (9) Whether
an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances; and (10) Whether a treaty with the affected
nations has addressed the issue. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979).
38
Id. at 187.
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in mind, the appellate court reasoned that the international comity
factors favor refraining from further intervention. Ultimately,
“China’s strong interest in its protectionist economic policies,”
outweighed any antitrust enforcement interests of the United
States.39
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in June of 2018, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of an unanimous Court in favor of the
American buyers.40 The Court reasoned that the Second Circuit
was incorrect to find that American courts are bound to defer to a
foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws, and emphasized that FRCP 44.1 does not provide a level of deference as
guidance for these matters.41 Further, Justice Ginsburg wrote that
consideration of a foreign government’s interpretation of its own
laws must be on a case-by-case basis—rather than a bright-line
rule.42 Justice Ginsburg noted that some appropriate considerations
for evaluating a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law
include, “the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its
context and purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system;
the role and authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past positions.”43 These considerations center on the quality
and the trustworthiness of the statement, rather than pure deference
alone. Further, Justice Ginsburg noted that FRCP 44.1 logically
requires a court to consider the foreign law as a “question of law,”
not of fact.44 Therefore, the Court should not be restricted on the
evidence it reviews, and it should consider all relevant evidence in
making its determination of the foreign law. Because the Court
determined that the Chinese government’s statement was not
bound to absolute deference, it remanded the case for consideration
of relevant materials.45
39

Animal Sci. Products Inc., 837 F.3d at 194.
Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1872 (2018).
41
Id. at 1873 (“As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Rule 44.1 does
not address the weight a federal court determining foreign law should give to the
views presented by the foreign government.”).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1868.
44
Id. at 1869.
45
Id. at 1875.
40

194

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 51:185

ARGUMENT

A.
A Brief History of Foreign Government Amicus Briefs in
U.S. Federal Court, with a Special Focus on China
This section will provide a brief history into how amicus briefs
began, how they have changed overtime, and China’s appearance
as amicus in antitrust actions in the Supreme Court.
Amicus briefs, also known as “friend of the court” briefs, have
evolved overtime to what we know today.46 The concept originated
in Roman Law and pre-eighteenth century England.47 Back then,
an amicus brief was actually an in-court attorney that represented
neither party, whose sole presence was to engage in “oral shepardizing,” i.e. inform the judge of any unknown case law.48 In 1821,
the first amicus in U.S. court was Henry Clay in Green v. Biddle.49
This was a land dispute case in which Clay personally appeared
before the Supreme Court to act as an amicus on behalf of nonparty landowners.50 The case, decided in 1823, marks the beginning of the amicus brief transformation from an unbiased lawyer
speaking on the issue, to advocacy on behalf of a party.51
The evolution of amicus briefs and the effects of globalization
have led to a greater presence of foreign amicus in the Supreme
Court.52 According to a systematic study conducted by Eichensehr
53
on foreign governments’ amicus brief filings to the Court in
2016, forty-six countries have filed or signed amicus briefs in merit cases in the past four decades.54 Merit briefs involve substantive
legal questions, like the brief submitted by the Ministry in Animal

46

Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV.
1757, 1765–68 (2014).
47
Id. at 1765.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1766; Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 17 (1823).
50
Green, 21 U.S. at 17 (In this case, Clay served both as an arm of the court
and as a representative for the non-party landowners.).
51
See Larsen, supra note 46, at 1766.
52
See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court,
102 VA. L. REV. 289, 306 (2016).
53
Kristen Eichensehr was a visiting Assistant Professor at UCLA School of
Law when she conducted this study.
54
Id.
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Science Products, Inc.55 Typically, countries with well-established
trade relationships with the U.S. file amicus briefs at the highest
rates in U.S. court. For example, the United Kingdom has filed the
highest amount of merit briefs in the past forty years.56 From the
sixty-eight foreign sovereign amicus briefs filed on the merits between 1978 to 2013, 44% address the foreign government’s domestic laws.57
While filing rates can tell us why foreign governments submit
amicus briefs, citation rates show us the weight the Court gives to
these briefs. From the thirty-nine merits cases involving at least
one foreign amicus brief since 1978, Eichensehr found that 44%
were cited at least once in the opinion of the case.58 This number
proves to be even more significant when compared to Supreme
Court cites of other institutional entities. In 2000, Kearney and
Merrill59 conducted a study that involved the Court’s citation rates
of the ACLU and the AFL-CIO from 1986 to 1995.60 The study
found that, during this time period, the Court cited 4.86% of briefs
submitted by the ACLU and 9.72% of briefs submitted by the
AFL-CIO.61 During this same time period, the Court cited 55% of
amicus briefs submitted by foreign governments.62
Animal Science Products, Inc. is a critical case to examine because it marks the first time the Chinese government has submitted
an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in a proceeding in which one
of the parties is from its own country.63 The top five countries who
55
See Id. at 306; Brief of Amicus Curiae Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China in Support of Respondents, Animal Sci. Products, Inc.
v. Hebei Welcome Pharm Co. Ltd.,138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220), 2018
WL 1666001.
56
See Eichensehr, supra note 52.
57
Id. at 318.
58
Id. at 320-21.
59
Kearney was an Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette University when
he conducted this study. He now serves as the Dean of this law school. Merrill
was a John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University when he
conducted this study. He is now a Professor of Law at Yale University.
60
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 761 (2000).
61
Id.
62
See Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 322.
63
This determination was made by cross-referencing the LexisNexis and
Westlaw Supreme Court briefs databases.
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file amicus briefs to the Court are the United Kingdom, Canada,
Mexico, Switzerland, and Japan.64 China, despite being a top trading partner to the United States, is noticeably absent from the list
of the top five filers of amicus briefs.65
The only other instance the Chinese government submitted an
amicus brief to the Supreme Court was in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.
v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l. 66 That case involved a bid for a
construction company in which a New Jersey-based Nigerian company was accused of bribing the Nigerian government in order to
be awarded the construction contract.67 A bidder that was not
awarded the contract sued the winning company after learning
about a 20% commission it paid to two Panamanian “entities” for
aiding the successful bidder in securing the contract.68 China submitted a brief to urge the Court to stay out of this matter.69
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., China—although not directly involved in that case—submitted an amicus brief for two main reasons: (1) China is a top trading partner of the United States, so it is
itself no stranger to being called into proceedings here and recognizes the function of the Act of State doctrine in preventing U.S.
courts from having to decide pending claims that have the potential
to harm foreign relations; and (2) China’s distress regarding the
effects of allowing unsuccessful bidders to call into question a foreign government’s decision to contract by claiming corrupt activities in the selection process.70 The two other amicus briefs submit64
Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 307 (European Union, placed second, is
removed from the list above because it is a union of 28-member countries, as it
refers to itself on its official website: https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu_en.).
65
International Trade Administration, https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build
/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (last visited
Mar. 9, 2019).
66
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400
(1990).
67
Id. at 401.
68
Id. at 402.
69
Brief of the Republic of China as Amicus Curiae, W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co.v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066), 1989
WL 1127463.
70
See id; The Act of State doctrine prevents federal courts from invalidating
the official act of a foreign sovereign involving activities within its own territory. Id. at 405.
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ted in this case were by the American Bar Association and the
United States Department of Justice.71 It is interesting to note that
the Court’s opinion only directly addresses the amicus brief of the
Department of Justice.72
Ultimately, the Court was not convinced by China’s argument
that the Act of State doctrine must preclude its involvement in the
case.73 The Court reasoned that the Act of State doctrine does not
create an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass
foreign governments.74 Rather, it requires courts to deem the acts
of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions valid.75
Because the validity of the foreign sovereign act was not at issue in
the case, the Act of State doctrine was not applicable.76
There are a couple important distinctions to note between W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. and Animal Science Products, Inc. First, Nigeria
acknowledged that Nigerian law forbids the procurement and acceptance of bribes for government contracts.77 At the center of dispute in Animal Science Products, Inc. was whether Chinese law
actually required the Chinese suppliers to participate in price and
quantity fixing.78 Second, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. did not involve a
foreign governments’ interpretation of its own law, so its words
likely did not carry as much weight as the amicus brief in Animal
Science Products, Inc.
B.
Problems Posed by U.S. Courts Facing Issues of Foreign
Law
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of exercising caution to remain objective in the face of other, perhaps unfa71

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066),
1989 WL 1127469; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066),
1988 WL 1026122.
72
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co, 493 U.S. at 408.
73
Id. at 401.
74
See id. at 409-10.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See id. at 406.
78
Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1870 (2018).
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miliar, cultures and societies.79 Justice Kennedy wrote in Abbott v.
Abbott that “[j]udges must strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought
not interfere with objective consideration . . . .” 80 Although the
judiciary is an objective branch, it would only be natural for the
humans that comprise it to have certain preconceived notions of
unfamiliar territory. This raises a couple thought-provoking questions: (1) is the likelihood of foreign amicius success at least
somewhat determined by its country of origin, and (2) what difficulties do courts encounter when interpreting foreign law?
In civil law jurisdictions, legal codes take precedent to judicial
decision when it comes to interpreting law.81 In Curley v. AMR
Corp., the Second Circuit acknowledged that the court had a duty
to consider how Mexican courts interpret their own laws because
Mexican law is so different from New York state law.82 Mexico is
a civil law jurisdiction and these jurisdictions depart greatly from
our legal traditions.83 The Second Circuit had to answer the question of whether the defendant met the standard for illicit action or
against “good customs and habits” of Mexico.84 This case presents
the dilemma of U.S. courts needing to know societal norms to
make a ruling. In instances like these, deferring to amicus briefs
may be the only way for them to know this information.
Developing countries present a very different obstacle. Oftentimes, recordings of their laws are hard to find—making it almost
impossible to concretely interpret the relevant law. 85 It is only the
ability of courts to conduct their own investigations that can truly
lead to the best results. If a federal court is presented with a case
involving a contested foreign law of a developing country, and the
79

See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (child custody dispute involving aspects of Chilean law).
80
Id.
81
Berkeley Law School, The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CommonLawCivil
LawTraditions.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
82
Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1998).
83
Comm. on Int’l Commercial Disputes, Proof of Foreign Law after Four
Decades with Rule 44.1 FRCP and CPLR 4511, 61 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y.
49, 56 (2006).
84
Curley, 153 F.3d at 15.
85
Comm. on Int’l Commercial Disputes, supra note 83, at 56.
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foreign government submitted an amicus brief to explain the contest law, courts would be wholly blocked from meaningful investigation into the issues of the case. Just because the interpretation
would be meaningful, the court would have to oblige the foreign
sovereign’s statement. This in turn could lead to a confusion of the
issues and misapplication of law.
With Animal Science Products, Inc., the need to understand the
differences in legal and societal norms is no different. The deference that the Second Circuit demonstrated can be especially important where the legal system is so different. According to the
Chinese government in this case, Chinese law requires pricefixing.86 Were this to be true, this would be the exact opposite of
what the American government requires.87 It is no question that the
differences in the way China and the United States conduct business are massive. For example, China boasts a state-run news industry and policy bank.88 Additionally, China influences its tech
market. The Chinese government released the “Made in China
2025” Key Area Technology Roadmap (Made in China
Roadmap).89 This roadmap sets clear market share targets domestically and globally to be met by Chinese producers in a number of
high-tech industries.90 As stated previously, the second international comity factor accounts for “nationality of the parties, locations or principal places of business of corporations.”91 This factor
suggests that courts may need to treat parties differently based upon where they are from.
86

Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1870 (2018) (stating that Chinese sellers moved to dismiss the U. S. purchasers’ complaint on the ground that Chinese law required them to fix the price
and quantity of vitamin C exports).
87
Id. at 1867 (explaining that the Chinese sellers engaged in price-fixing
activity in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
88
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF
THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED
TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION
UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018), 90-92.
89
Id. at 10.
90
Id. at 15.
91
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm.
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
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This begs the question, would this case have turned out differently if the amicus brief and the defendants were from another
country more closely related to the U.S. legal system? Could it be
that the Supreme Court acted in a way that Justice Kennedy cautioned against in Abbott?92 To answer this question, we must first
look at antitrust jurisprudence in the Supreme Court where foreign
governments have submitted briefs. To do this investigation, I
cross-referenced the Supreme Court databases on Westlaw and
LexisNexis to analyze the outcomes of amicus briefs submitted by
the United States top trading partners93 in antitrust lawsuits where
an organization or corporation from its country was a defendant.
Let us begin with the highest filer of amicus briefs to the Supreme Court: the United Kingdom.94 For the United Kingdom, the
only brief on these databases that fits this description comes from
the case Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.95 Plaintiffs in that
case alleged that domestic members of the insurance industry colluded with domestic and foreign insurers to obtain changes in insurance coverage, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.96
In a brief submitted by the United Kingdom, the government
pleaded with the Court to refrain from finding liability on part of
the petitioners because application of U.S. antitrust law would produce major conflict with English law and policy.97 The amicus
brief raised the issue of “mutual respect between close allies and
deference to principles of international law and comity,” and it
further asserted that the appellate court decision disregarded these
principles by exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this
claim.98 Ultimately, the Court chose to exercise jurisdiction be92

See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (stating that “[j]udges must
strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration “ when
deciding cases).
93
The top trading partners are Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, and the United Kingdom. International Trade Administration, supra note 65.
94
See Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 307.
95
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
96
Id. at 770-71.
97
See Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No.
91-1129), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 774 *.
98
Id.
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cause no direct conflict of the laws existed.99 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took
place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws,” even where the foreign state has a strong policy to
permit or encourage such conduct.100 The defendants could comply
with both laws, and thus were held liable.101
For Japan, only one case falls into this category: F HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.102 That case involved several Japanese companies accused of partaking in an international cartel to
fix prices and apportion markets for bulk vitamin sales throughout
U.S. markets.103 Similar to Animal Science Products, Inc., the
plaintiffs in the case were purchasers of vitamins in foreign markets.104 The Court’s opinion centered around whether the exceptions of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(“FTAIA”) apply to the Japanese companies’ activity.105 The
FTAIA states that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct
involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations”; unless, the
conduct considerably harms American imports, domestic commerce, or exports.106 The Japanese government’s brief pleaded the
Court to maintain principles of comity, stating that that allowing
foreign purchasers to claim damages for solely foreign conduct
damages the imperative principles of comity.107 The Court held
that because the plaintiff’s harm from the alleged price-fixing activity relied entirely on “independent foreign harm,” the antitrust
laws of the United States should not apply.108 This case was ulti-

99

Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 509 U.S. at 799 (citing Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 415) (stating no conflict where a person can comply with
both laws).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
103
Id. at 159.
104
Id. at 159.
105
See id. at 158-59.
106
Id. at 161.
107
See Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(No. 03-724), 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 106 *.
108
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 166-67.
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mately remanded to address an argument not reached by the appellate court.109
According to a search of the Westlaw and LexisNexis Supreme
Court Brief databases, Mexico has never filed an amicus brief in an
antitrust suit on behalf of parties from its country to the Supreme
Court. The only amicus brief that Canada has filed in an antitrust
suit on behalf of parties from its country to the Supreme Court was
an amicus brief for writ of certiorari, which was ultimately denied.110 From the case law, a pattern emerges. In both Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. (the antitrust suit involving insurers from the United
Kingdom) and F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (the antitrust suit involving Japanese companies), the Court set aside the arguments
raised in the foreign amicus briefs to adhere to principles of international comity, and chose instead to rule in favor of the plaintiffs
and to enforce U.S. law.111
C.
Deference to a Foreign Government’s Interpretation of its
Own Laws
This section will discuss my perspective on the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling that federal courts are not bound to defer
to a country’s interpretation of its own law. It will contain an indepth discussion into the pros and cons of extending absolute deference to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws.
The discussion will include the most contested principles from the
Eastern District of New York, the Second Circuit, and United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court wrote that when interpreting foreign law,
the appropriate weight of deference will “depend on the circumstances.”112 As mentioned earlier, these circumstances include the
“statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and
109

Id. at 175.
See Brief for Amicus Curiae Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, In Support of Petitioners, Agrium, Inc. v. MinnChem, Inc., 570 U.S. 935 (2013), (No. 12-650), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
5449 *; Agrium Inc. v. Minn-Chem, Inc., 570 U.S. 935 (2013).
111
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 166-67.
112
Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1868 (2018).
110
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purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and
authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the
statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past positions.”113 At first glance, the question of appropriate deference may
seem rather simple. If the U.S. wants other countries to respect
what we have to say about our laws, we must respect what they
have to say about their own laws, i.e. we must employ the international comity mindset. However, dealing with the interpretation of
foreign law is much more complex. We must strive to find the
right balance.
1. Why Federal Courts Should Defer
Under Chevron deference, U.S. courts provide absolute deference to a domestic agency’s interpretations of the laws that govern
the agency,114 so why should U.S. courts not also provide this deference to a foreign government’s interpretation of laws that govern
them? This question is something that courts have grappled with
before. In Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France
on Mar. 16, 1978, the Seventh Circuit deferred to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law—and cited to the case that
established Chevron deference in its opinion.115 There are several
reasons why federal courts may want to provide a version of Chevron deference to foreign governments.
a.
Judges are not experts on foreign law
Justice Breyer, in an article about U.S. law and global effects,
recently highlighted that “[t]he justices are not experts on the practices of other nations” and to remedy this “knowledge gap,” it is
113

Id.
Chevron Deference is a type of judicial deference given to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible for enforcing. The doctrine was established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
115
See Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on Mar. 16,
1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A court of the United States owes
substantial deference to the construction France places on its domestic law.
Courts of this nation routinely accept plausible constructions of laws by the
agencies charged with administering them. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984).”).
114
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“helpful to receive briefs from other nations.”116 Federal court is
no stranger to foreign agencies interpreting law in U.S. court. Even
though federal judges deal with foreign law concepts, this does not
mean that they know everything that is important to decisionmaking. These same federal judges look to amicus briefs concerning domestic law, which is wrapped up in all the cultural norms
that the judges are familiar with. Judges indisputably use amicus
briefs to both educate themselves on a given topic and use it for
their decision-making process. Two-thirds of the times that the
Supreme Court cited to an amicus brief during the 2012-2013 term,
there was no accompanying citation to support what it was writing.117 Because judges are not experts on foreign law, foreign amicus assist federal courts in interpreting unfamiliar law.118
One example of the Court’s acknowledgement of unfamiliar
law arises in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd..119 In this
case, an Australian bank was accused of committing fraud in the
trade of its shares, arising under the Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act.120 The opinion cites to an amicus brief submitted by the United Kingdom to acknowledge that regulations in other countries regularly deviates from our own—including, but not
limited to, what rises to the level of fraud and what disclosures
need to be given.121 Because all of the activity took place offshores, and Section 10(b) only applies to domestic conduct, and all
the claims took place outside the United States, the Court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the complaint.122

116

Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New
Global Realities 133 (2015).
117
Larsen, supra note 46, at 7.
118
Justice Breyer acknowledges the important role foreign amicus briefs
play in cases involving foreign law when he writes, “[i]t is . . . helpful to receive
briefs from other nations as well as pertinent foreign associations.” Breyer, supra note 116.
119
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
120
Id. at 253.
121
Id. at 269.
122
Id. at 273.
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b.
To avoid tensions while simultaneously enabling
trade and international relations
The global economy today requires a level of positive international relations to thrive. Thus, declining to exercise deference to
foreign government interpretation could send a message that is
detrimental to international relations. It is important to consider
exactly how international relations for the U.S. are affected when
the Supreme Court essentially conveys that it will not trust the interpretation—and ways to avoid this dilemma altogether.123
c.
To streamline the judicial process and avoid
expensive legal experts
One comprehensive study conducted on over 1,000 expert witnesses in over 300 fields of work found that the average pay for incourt testimony is $385/hour, with the highest reported to be
$7,500/hour.124 Trials can last for multiple days, and this cost does
not even consider other pre-trial needs for expert witnesses—such
as retainer fees, hourly deposition fees, or travel expenses. Providing deference to a foreign government’s interpretations of its own
laws eliminates all of these issues and streamlines the process. In
Animal Science Product, Inc., there was a battle of the experts. The
U.S. purchasers relied on an expert on Chinese law to argue that
the defendants’ conduct was not compelled by Chinese law.125 In
contrast, the Chinese suppliers relied on expert testimony to support its contention that the Chinese government’s interpretation of
its own law was accurate.126 Perhaps litigation costs for clients
could decrease if the Court deferred to foreign amicus briefs.
Still, there is more to consider. It is important to weigh the reasons federal courts should defer to a foreign governments’ interpretations of its own laws against the reasons why federal courts
should not defer, in order to be fully aware of the consequences
their deference.
123

See infra Part IV, D for more on the current state international relations
and trade with China.
124
Expert Witness Fees, SEAK, https://seak.com/expert-witness-fee-study/
(last visited September 1, 2019).
125
See Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1867 (2018).
126
Id. at 1871.
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2. Why Federal Courts Should Not Defer.
Some may argue that federal courts should afford foreign governments the same amount of deference as they do with Chevron
deference to U.S. agencies.127 However, the theory behind Chevron
deference would be misapplied to foreign governments for two key
reasons.
In contrast to foreign agencies, U.S. officials are responsible
for appointments within domestic agencies. This gives a level of
control over the persons in these agencies and familiarity with
these persons. Second, these domestic agencies are governed by
U.S. domestic laws, which federal judges are inherently more familiar with than foreign law. Although there may be benefits that
come with deference to a foreign government’s interpretations of
their its own law, it would be imprudent to overlook the dangers
that accompany this approach. There are several reasons why federal courts may not choose to defer.
a.
Federal courts should be allowed to keep their
independence
Michael Gottlieb, attorney for the United States in Animal Science Products, Inc., said this decision “will promote free and open
markets, while protecting the independence of the U.S. courts.”128
If federal courts are bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation, then the decision-making autonomy of the judicial
branch—the gatekeeper that enforces our nation’s laws—is greatly
threatened.
b.
To avoid the danger in ignoring resources, such as
expert testimony and independent research
There are dangers involved in accepting statements from amicus briefs as true, especially in a lawsuit where there is much at
stake. The potential for confusion of the facts and/or interpretation
of law when all parties are domestic and bound to U.S. laws are
127

See generally Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 296.
Andrew Chung and Lawrence Hurley, Trump gets win at U.S. Supreme
Court in China antitrust case, REUTERS (June 14, 2018, 7:12 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-china/supreme-court-hands-trumpwin-in-china-antitrust-case-idUSKBN1JA21B.
128
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undeniable. This problem is multiplied when one side to the suit is
foreign. The need to accurately understand the laws are even more
important. Ignoring resources—more specifically testimony challenging the Chinese government’s statement on interpretation of its
own law—is the reason the Supreme Court remanded Animal Science Products, Inc.129
Further, federal courts cannot simply take what they are given
at face value.130 The Seventh Circuit in Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank
of Chicago cautioned that “[a]ll too often counsel will do an inadequate job of researching and presenting foreign law or will attempt
to prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is obliged to go
beyond their offerings.”131 Although that case involved purely domestic parties, this principle applies to foreign parties as well. We
must allow our judicial branch to fulfill its purpose in reaching
unbiased determinations of law. This is exactly what FRCP 44.1
allows the judiciary to do when it encounters questions of foreign
law.
c.
To avoid countries from misrepresenting their laws
to circumvent lawsuits
In Animal Science Products, Inc., the Supreme Court said
“[w]hen a foreign govt. makes conflicting statements . . . or offers
an account in the context of litigation, there may be cause for causation in evaluating the government’s submission.”132 This is a
gravely important consideration that many advocates for absolute
deference overlook. In Bamberger v. Clark, the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged that mere presence of FRCP 44.1 on the books does
not mean that federal courts will no longer defer to a foreign agen129

Justice Ginsburg noted that “[b]ecause the Court of Appeals concluded
that the District Court was bound to defer to the Ministry’s brief, the court did
not consider the shortcomings the District Court identified in the Ministry’s
position.” The Court did not take a position on the correct interpretation of Chinese law, but said the evidence identified by the district court were at least relevant to the correct interpretation of Chinese law. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1875, (2018).
130
See Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir.
1985) (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, § 2444, p. 408).
131
Id.
132
Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865, 1873 (2018).
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cy’s interpretation, as long as the view is “not unreasonable or contrary to the plainly ascertainable intent of the legislature.”133 This
practically mirrors the Second Circuit’s view of deference that federal courts are bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law when that interpretation is reasonable in Animal
Science Products, Inc.134 However, the Second Circuit in this case
did not include language prohibiting unreasonable interpretations
or contradictory interpretations of the legislature. This short phrase
at the end functions very differently from the Second Circuit’s
view of deference to require the statement to go beyond one more
hurdle—that is, to allow for federal courts to review legislative
evidence in its decision-making. If we evaluate the Chinese government’s statement through this context, its inability to point to a
specific law that required price-fixing could mean that its interpretation would be contrary to the legislature and outside the scope of
appropriate deference.
Deference to foreign sovereigns is unquestionably important.
The solution is not absolute deference to foreign amicus briefs, but
rather, to view them critically. A court should ensure that what the
foreign government is representing is actually indicative of the law
it claims to interpret. Here, the Chinese government failed at the
district court level to point to a single provision to support its contention that the Chinese suppliers were forced to engage in price
fixing.135 For this specific reason, the Court was wise to remand
the case to allow further investigation.

133

Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reasoning that
“in some instances at least a court will defer to an agency’s view of a question of
law even though the court itself would not have decided the question the same
way if it had considered the matter in the first instance—assuming of course that
the agency’s view is not unreasonable or contrary to the plainly ascertainable
intent of the legislature”).
134
See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome
Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
135
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554-55 (E.D.N.Y.
2008), rev’d, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865,
201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018).
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3. Can there be a balance?
Under principles of international comity, the Second Circuit in
Animal Science Products, Inc. was convinced by the Chinese government’s statements in its amicus brief. This sort of absolute deference meant so much imperative evidence was never even reviewed to allow the court to make an informed determination
based on all the evidence. In Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
there must be a limit on principles of comity.136 The court reasoned
that domestic policy should have priority over comity and that a
court should not be compelled to protect foreign interests over interests of the forum state.137 Because that case also involved an
agency’s interpretation of law from its country at issue, it presents
a helpful analogy to Animal Science Products, Inc. The Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled that Mexican agency’s interpretation did not
deserve deference because it was not party to the suit and there was
no evidence that this agency was given the power to interpret the
law existed.138
One solution to problems posed by foreign law in federal
courts is found in the New York State Court of Appeals’ and the
Supreme Court of New South Wales’ reciprocity system.139 The
first of its kind, this reciprocity system was created to combat the
expensive cost of legal experts and diminish confusion caused by
contradictory information on foreign law.140 The participants state
that this system is an answer to the legal system’s impediment on
transnational trade and investment.141 When executed correctly,
136

Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F3d 694, 707 (5th
Cir. 1999).
137
Id. (citing Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d
65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994)).
138
Id. at 714-15.
139
The Hon. J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, MOU Between New York and New South Wales Address (Oct. 28,
2010), in COMPILATION OF SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE HON. J.J. SPIGELMAN,
AC, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NSW IN 2010.
140
Wilson, supra note 5, at 919.
141
See The Hon. J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, MOU Between New York and New South Wales Address (Oct. 28,
2010), in COMPILATION OF SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE HON. J.J. SPIGELMAN,
AC, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NSW IN 2010, at 14.
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reciprocity systems can ensure accurate interpretation of each
other’s laws by providing unbiased interpretations and guaranteeing efficiency.142 Perhaps the U.S. could benefit from a reciprocity
system with countries that it has important trading relationships
with. After all, China consistently ranks as the U.S.’s third highest
trading partner.143
V.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS
DECISION
China and the U.S. have had a long-standing and complicated
relationship with one another for many years, ranging from competition to strong business ties.144 This section will discuss the foreign policy implications of the Animal Science Products, Inc. Supreme Court decision. To provide context, it will analyze the trade
talks with China from 2018 and ponder where Animal Science
Products, Inc. leaves us today.
The trade talk dance with China began in January of 2018 by
the U.S.-issued tariffs on washing machine and solar cell imports
from China.145 Despite the fact that the majority of imports of targeted did not come from China,146 this was done to send a message
of U.S. dominance over the global supply chain.147 The next
month, China began a one-year anti-subsidy investigation of sorghum imported into China from the U.S.148 Then in March 2018,
142
See generally id. (explaining that “[l]ike most international arrangements,
this system will only be effective on the basis of true reciprocity.”).
143
Typically, Canada is the first and Mexico is the second. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, TOP U.S. TRADE PARTNERS RANKED BY 2017 U.S. TOTAL EXPORT
VALUE FOR GOODS (2018); U.S. Census Buraeu, Top Trading Partners,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2019).
144
See U.S. Relations with China: 1949-2019, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china (last visited Oct. 17,
2019).
145
The Trade War Is On: How We Got Here and What’s Next, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (September 17, 2018, 5:59 p.m.), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2018-09-18/the-trade-war-is-on-timeline-of-how-we-got-here-andwhat-s-next.
146
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147
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Trump issued tariffs on steel and aluminum from all countries.149
In response, China chose to impose tariffs on three billion American dollars worth of imports from the U.S.150 This cat and mouse
game continued, and remains to continue, for months—mostly
consisting of threats to impose tariffs on even more goods from
both sides.151
Experts say that these tariffs are a much bigger hit to China
than the U.S.152 For the U.S., American markets have the potential
to disperse evenly among the different markets. If the U.S. stops
buying from China, China would take a large hit. As one expert put
it, “where would China’s goods go?”153 The world is watching, and
President Trump has proved he will not shy away from engaging in
this trade war. In September 2018, the president tweeted that the
tariffs placed on China put the U.S. is a “strong bargaining position,” adding that countries who do not make “fair deals with
us . . . will be ‘[t]ariffed.’”154
During this back and forth, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative placed China as a top priority on its watch
list of nations for the fourteenth consecutive year.155 This Office
explained that both old and new intellectual property concerns
warranted heightened focus, consisting of: trade secret theft, “rampant” online piracy, and counterfeit manufacturing.156 Aside from
these reasons, China has been notorious for hacking into technology systems in the U.S. Supermicro, a U.S. company that manufacture its motherboards in China, discovered small microchips on its

149
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devices that were not supposed to be there.157 Upon further investigation, Supermicro discovered that the microchips were inserted
during the manufacturing process in China at the direction of the
People’s Liberation Army.158 With these microchips, the hackers
had the ability to (1) tell the device to communicate with an anonymous computer with more complex code somewhere else on the
internet; and (2) manipulate the device to accept that code.159 This
means that a device that once required security safeguards to obtain access could entirely by-pass the device’s safeguards with the
aid of the remote code from the microchip.160 Just to realize the
magnitude of this hacking scandal, it is essential to note that Supermicro provides motherboards for top U.S. companies—
including Apple and Amazon.161
In April 2018, the U.S. announced that it would be conducting
an investigation into Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecom
manufacturer, for possible violations of sanctions against Iran.162
Then, in December 2018, Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei,
was arrested in Canada to determine whether she would face
charges of fraud connected to the Iran sanctions.163 In March 2019,
Wanzhou appeared in Canadian court; however, no final decision
to press charges was made at that time.164 Currently, Wanzhou faces 13 counts of conspiracy, fraud and obstruction in the U.S.165 Her
hearing is set to begin in January 2020.166
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In the spring of 2018, the U.S. placed additional tariffs on China pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.167 These tariffs were put in place in response to an investigation that revealed
China’s technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation
practices are unreasonable, discriminatory, and burden or restrict
U.S. commerce.168
The tumultuous relations with China go way beyond trade relations with the two nation’s presidents. In the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress forbid government agencies
from purchasing goods from Huawei or any company that utilizes
Huawei’s equipment.169 The Chinese tech giant responded with a
lawsuit, suing the U.S. under the claim that this prohibition is a
violation of the Constitution’s Bill of Attainder clause.170 Huawei
states that this clause forbids Congress from singling out an individual or company to issue a punishment without a trial.171 Hofstra
University law professor Julian Ku commented that U.S. courts
will likely not find this argument persuasive, because “doing business with the U.S. government doesn’t seem to be a fundamental
right, and there are reasonable grounds for Congress to act against
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Huawei.”172 This lawsuit has just begun, so we will see the result
in the coming months, and more likely, years.
With strained foreign relations with China for many years, Animal Science Products, Inc. may have just added fuel to the fire.
The two countries’ relations may be complicated, but they are enduring. This trade dispute has no end in sight. One thing is for certain, whether the leaders want to admit it or not: as it stands today,
both countries’ economies depend on it each other for success.
VI.
TAKEAWAYS AND REMAINING QUESTIONS
Although Animal Science Products, Inc. may seem like the
long-awaited answer to the question of appropriate foreign deference, this decision does not solve everything. Because this case
involves a foreign government’s interpretation if its own law, the
Court’s decision leaves open the question of whether federal courts
may look beyond an official statement submitted by a foreign
court. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the issue of “whether
Chinese law required the Chinese sellers’ conduct” lingered,
requiring the Court to remand the case.173 It is indisputable that this
story is not yet over. As of the date of publication, the Second Circuit has yet to hear the remand of this case.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court acted wisely by considering the
circumstances. While the Court must be cautious of becoming too
protectionist and/or nationalist, at times the policy of the U.S.
needs to come first. With this decision, the Court has not closed off
deference to other countries altogether. Instead, it solidified the
already established notion under FRCP 44.1 that courts may conduct their own independent investigations when answering questions of foreign law that involves a foreign government’s interpretation of its law. The Court maintained its autonomy, did not ignore evidence showing contradictory information, and upheld the
principles of U.S. antitrust law.
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